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We examine whether the previously documented positive association between fund family size 
and fund performance is affected by significant regulatory changes (i.e., Regulation FD, the 
Global Settlement (GS), and increased scrutiny as a result of trading scandals) that have occurred 
in the last decade.  Using Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) as a beginning point for these 
structural changes, we find that while fund family size was positively associated with fund 
performance in the period prior to the regulatory changes, this advantage is significantly weaker 
in the period subsequent to the regulatory changes.  Consistent with the weakened advantage of 
fund family size in fund performance, we find that the greater stock picking skill of larger fund 
families, measured using the earnings announcement returns of the stocks they trade, also 
weakened subsequent to the regulatory changes.  Using narrower event windows around the 
regulatory changes, we find that the previously documented superior return of large fund families 
was partly attributable to selective disclosure.  We also find that fund families implicated in the 
trading scandals experienced a decline in their performance during the scandal period.  Finally, 
we examine the role of large investment banks in providing an advantage to large fund families.  
Family size was positively associated with the extent to which funds traded in the same direction 
as forecast revisions by analysts from large investment banks in the period prior to Reg FD and 
the GS and this association declined significantly after the two regulatory events.   
 
Keywords: Mutual funds, Reg FD, Global Settlement, Late Trading, Market Timing, Selective disclosure 
 
* We gratefully acknowledge the guidance of Abbie Smith (the editor) and the referee.  We thank Robert Libby for 
his comments.  We also thank the workshop participants at Cornell University and the McMaster Accounting 
Conference participants, for their comments.    
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1937197
1 
 
Mutual Fund Family Size and Mutual Fund Performance:  The Role of Regulatory 
Changes 
The mutual fund industry has become a significant player in the capital markets.  The size 
of the industry has increased from about $50 billion in 1970 to about $10 trillion in 2009.  This 
growth is primarily driven by the significant role these funds play in managing retirement assets.  
With the explosive growth in this industry and its key role in managing retirement assets, the 
performance of mutual funds has come under greater scrutiny.  Prior work examining fund 
performance has found that, on average, mutual funds underperform the market (e.g., Jensen, 
1968; Malkiel, 1995; Gruber, 1996).  Other issues examined include the mutual fund flows, risk 
and style choices and other factors that affect variation in performance across funds.1  Recent 
research finds that the performance of a mutual fund is positively related to the size of the family 
to which it belongs (Chen, Hong, Huang and Kubik, 2004; Pollet and Wilson, 2008).  While 
these papers examine sample periods ending in 2000, major regulatory changes including 
Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), the Global Settlement (GS), and increased regulatory 
scrutiny resulting from the market timing and late trading scandals have since affected the 
industry.  These changes may have reduced selective access to firm information (Reg FD), 
decreased the quality of sell-side analyst research at large investment banks (Reg FD and the 
GS), and reduced the ability of fund families to benefit from the provision of late trading and 
market timing opportunities (regulatory scrutiny from trading scandals).  We argue that these 
changes have had a greater effect on larger fund families and therefore, in this study, we examine 
                                                            
1 Some of the papers addressing these issues include Berk and Green (2004), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), 
Falkenstein (1996), Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1995), Sirri and Tufano (1998), Carhart (1997), Wermers 
(2000), Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu (2009), Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2009), Massa and Patgiri (2009) and 
Christoffersen et al. (2009). 
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whether these changes have affected the ability of larger fund families to outperform their 
smaller peers.   
Instituted in 2000 with the purpose of limiting selective disclosure of information by 
firms to analysts and institutional investors, Reg FD was the first major and direct regulatory 
change to affect the mutual fund industry.  Prior to Reg FD, there was a concern that analysts and 
institutions enjoyed and profited from privileged access to firms.  In discussing the background 
to Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), the Securities and Exchange Commission states:  
We have become increasingly concerned about the selective disclosure of material 
information by issuers. As reflected in recent publicized reports, many issuers are disclosing 
important nonpublic information, such as advance warnings of earnings results, to securities 
analysts or selected institutional investors or both, before making full disclosure of the same 
information to the general public. Where this has happened, those who were privy to the 
information beforehand were able to make a profit or avoid a loss at the expense of those kept 
in the dark.2  
  Extensive work examining the effect of Reg FD on analysts’ forecasts and behavior 
finds that the regulation has adversely impacted accuracy and has increased dispersion, 
suggesting that analysts had benefited in the past from selective access (Bailey et al., 2003; 
Gintschel and Markov, 2003; Groysberg et al., 2008).  While most work on Reg FD has focused 
on its effect on analysts, the other major constituency affected is the mutual fund industry.  Like 
analysts, mutual funds also enjoyed selective access to information prior to Reg FD.  This access 
was likely to be more pronounced for funds that belonged to large fund families because the 
member funds could be significant existing or potential investors in a firm and, therefore, could 
command preferential treatment.  Given that managers have a limited amount of time to devote 
to investor relations, it is logical that they would focus on the most significant group of investors.  
In addition, sell-side analysts gave preferential treatment to funds belonging to large fund 
families because their reports would have a larger audience (in terms of both the number of funds 
                                                            
2 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading (Regulation FD, August 15 2000)  
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and scale of investments) which would increase the potential for commissions.  Thus, the 
selective disclosure advantage suggests that, after controlling for fund size, funds belonging to 
larger fund families should have higher returns.3  Reg FD affected this advantage enjoyed by 
large fund families (1) by reducing the direct flow of information from firms to funds and (2) by 
reducing the flow of information from firms to analysts and thereby reducing the quality of 
information flow from analysts to funds.  This would suggest that the higher fund returns 
attributable to larger fund family membership should decrease after Reg FD.   
The second regulatory change relates to the GS.  The GS is an enforcement settlement 
between the regulatory entities and several large investment banks initially announced on 
December 20, 2002 with a final settlement on April 28, 2003.4  This settlement is primarily 
focused on separating research and investment banking roles in the investment banks.  Healy 
(2009) suggests that by separating the research and investment banking roles, the GS has 
changed the cost-benefit tradeoff of research to the large investment banks, thereby increasing 
analyst turnover and lowering overall coverage. Other potential ramifications include lower 
compensation and greater legal oversight of the analysts.  All these point to an adverse impact on 
the quality of research.  To the extent that large fund families relied on sell-side research from 
large investment banks and the research quality of large investment banks was adversely affected 
by the GS, we should expect a decline in the extent to which larger fund families relied on 
information provided by analysts belonging to these large investment banks.  However, the effect 
                                                            
3 A similar argument for information advantage could be made regarding fund size (rather than fund family size).  
This argument would suggest that larger funds should earn higher returns due to their privileged access to 
information.  However, this advantage is offset by several factors that create a drag on large fund performance 
including liquidity issues that limit the ability to invest in the best ideas and organizational diseconomies (Chen et al., 
2004). 
4 http://www.ag.ny.gov/media_center/2002/dec/dec20b_02.html, and http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm.  
As announced by the SEC, the settlement “requires payments of penalties of $487.5 million, disgorgement of $387.5 
million, payments of $432.5 million to fund independent research, and payments of $80 million to fund investor 
education and mandates sweeping structural reforms” (http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm).   
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of the GS on the primary focus of our study, the relation between fund family size and fund 
performance, is not obvious.  On the one hand, the lower quality of sell-side research could 
adversely affect the ability of funds in large fund families to outperform.  On the other hand, 
large fund families could offset this drop in the quality of sell-side research by increasing their 
in-house investment in research.  The effect of the GS on the link between fund family size and 
fund performance is, therefore, an open question.   
The third change relates to the increase in regulatory scrutiny triggered by “late trading” 
and “market timing” scandals. These trading scandals were first announced in September 2003 
and ensnared about two dozen large fund families over the following five months. The late 
trading scandal relates to situations where fund families allowed some customers to trade their 
funds after 4pm and still receive the 4pm assets under management (AUM) closing price.  Thus, 
customers could trade on information that was revealed to markets after 4pm, thereby ensuring 
profitable trades with near certainty.5  The market timing scandal refers to fund families allowing 
select clients to trade excessively in their funds.6  Usually, funds limit the number of times a fund 
can be bought and sold by a client during a given period (e.g., three times a month).  Some 
clients, however, received preferential treatment that allowed them to trade more often.  Though 
termed “market timing,” the scandal involves situations in which fund families provided 
preferential treatment to select clients that enabled them to trade more actively on inefficiencies 
in determining NAVs of the mutual funds (rather than on predicting market movements) (Houge 
and Wellman, 2005).  The focus was on taking advantage of situations such as stale prices, 
                                                            
5 New York Attorney General Elliott Spitzer characterized late trading as betting on a horse race after the horses 
have crossed the finish line (http://www.ag.ny.gov/media_center/2003/sep/sep03a_03.html). 
6 Unlike late trading, market timing through excessive trading by itself was not illegal.  It was allowing selective 
access to excessive trading opportunities that was inappropriate.   
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which can arise when some securities held by the fund do not trade close to the 4pm market 
close.7   
Providing late trading and market timing opportunities could reduce fund performance by 
increasing trading and administration costs which are borne by all investors. Performance could 
also be adversely affected by higher levels of cash reserves that funds might need to maintain to 
fulfill demands of market timing sellers of the funds.  However, fund families likely provided 
these opportunities because they believed that these costs were more than offset by revenues 
generated from sticky long-term AUM that they received from the select clients in exchange for 
providing these opportunities. Therefore, regulatory action limiting the use of these practices 
could affect fund performance.    
As with the GS, the effect of the regulatory scrutiny from the scandals, which limited the 
provision of late trading and market timing opportunities, on our question of interest (i.e., the 
relation between fund family size and fund performance) is also uncertain. This is because the 
effect is dependent on the degree to which the practices varied with fund family size. If the 
practices of late trading and market timing extended beyond the implicated fund families to other 
large fund families but not to the smaller fund families, then we should expect to find a change in 
relative performance of large fund families. If, however, the practices were prevalent across all 
fund families of various sizes and the implicated large fund families were being used by 
regulators to set an example to the entire industry, then we would not expect to see any change in 
                                                            
7 The argument relating to market timing that Eliot Spitzer made in his complaint can be summarized as follows.  
Mutual funds calculate their NAV based on prices available at 4pm every day.  In the case of an international 
focused fund (based in the US) or a domestic fund that has some of its investments in foreign stocks, the latest prices 
could be as much as 15 hours old (e.g., Asia or Japan focused funds or stocks).  If the U.S. markets rise steeply on a 
given day in response to some news, a speculator could buy these funds at 3:59pm (and get the NAV based on stale 
foreign prices), hoping that Asian markets will rise the next day in response to the news thereby causing the fund’s 
NAV to rise the following day.  Notice that this is different from late trading which allows trading after 4pm and 
still receiving 4pm NAV. 
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the relative performance of large fund families, as all fund families would be similarly affected.  
The final possibility is that the extensive and flagrant use of these practices was limited to the 
implicated fund families, in which case we would expect to see an adverse impact only for those 
implicated fund families but no change in relative performance of large fund families as a whole.    
Given that Reg FD was the earliest of the regulatory changes, we examine the effect of 
the regulatory changes on fund family performance by using the adoption year of Reg FD (i.e., 
2000) to partition our sample periods into pre and post-Reg FD periods.   In our primary 
analysis, following the research design in Chen et al. (2004) and using a sample of mutual funds 
from CRSP, we confirm the findings in prior studies that in the period prior to Reg FD, fund 
family size has a favorable impact on fund performance.  Consistent with prior work, we also 
find that fund size negatively affects fund performance.  Most importantly, we find that 
subsequent to Reg FD, fund family size is no longer associated with fund performance. The 
change in the coefficient on family size between the pre and post-Reg FD periods translates into 
a 5-basis point-per-month (about 60-basis point-per-year) change in performance. Given that our 
sample of mutual funds underperforms the market portfolio by 14 basis points per month (168 
basis points per year) after fees and expenses, the effect of the regulatory changes on the relation 
between fund family size and fund performance is not only statistically significant, but also 
economically important.  Fund size, on the other hand, continues to be negatively associated with 
fund performance.   
We also examine the family size advantage using an alternative approach. Following the 
research design in Baker et al. (2009) and using mutual fund holdings data from Thomson 
Financial, we examine whether fund family size is related to a fund’s stock-picking ability.  We 
measure this relationship using the earnings announcement returns of the stocks that the fund 
7 
 
families trade.  We find that in the pre-Reg FD period, after controlling for fund size, funds that 
belonged to larger fund families displayed greater stock-picking ability.  This finding provides a 
potential explanation for the previously documented positive association between fund family 
size and fund performance; that is, this association could be due to greater stock-picking ability 
more so than alternative explanations (e.g., higher stock loan fee revenue or lower costs).  In the 
post-Reg FD period, however, we find that fund family size is no longer associated with stock-
picking ability. The decline between the two periods is highly significant. This finding provides 
further evidence in support of a decline in the ability of large fund families to outperform 
following the regulatory changes.   
While all the regulatory changes discussed could have contributed to the decline in the 
relation between fund family size and fund performance, we attempt to isolate the effects of each 
of the changes on performance.  We do so by focusing on a short period surrounding each of the 
events.  The advantage of this approach is that it can help isolate the impact of each of the 
changes, thereby providing some evidence of the relative contribution of each event.  However, 
by focusing on a short period, we lose power in our tests, thereby making it more difficult to 
reject the null hypothesis.  The result from this analysis indicates that a significant deterioration 
in relative performance of large fund families occurred in the period immediately after Reg FD.8  
While the coefficient on family size is significantly positive for fund performance in the period 
immediately prior to Reg FD (i.e., 1999), the coefficient in the period immediately after Reg FD 
                                                            
8 One potential confound is that the narrow event period subsequent to Reg FD saw a significant market correction. 
It could, therefore, be argued that the short-period poor performance by large fund families is related to the market 
correction.  This is unlikely to be a significant problem since the market correction should have had a larger effect 
on large fund families as compared to small fund families in explaining our findings.  There is no reason to believe 
that is the case.  However, to examine the implications and sensitivity of our findings to this potential confound, we 
carried out a similar analysis around the previous market correction (1990).  We find that the monthly coefficients 
during the previous market correction stayed positive and were therefore different from what we observe in the post-
Reg FD period.   
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(i.e., 2001) is no longer significant. There is an economically and statistically significant decline 
in the effect of fund family size on fund performance around the adoption of Reg FD.  
Given that the GS and the trading scandals occurred within a few months of each other, 
we first examine the effect of both events together.  Comparing fund performance for the year 
prior to the initial announcement of the GS (i.e., ending November 2002) and the year following 
the end to most announcements about implicated fund families (i.e., starting March 2004), we 
find that the coefficient on fund family size is not significant in both periods.  Given that our 
tests are unable to detect a positive relationship, our results suggest that the positive relation 
between fund family size and fund performance deteriorated after Reg FD and prior to the GS. 
Further, we find no significant change in the relation between fund family size and fund 
performance around the GS and trading scandals.  We carry out an additional analysis examining 
the relative performance of large fund families in general as well as specific implicated fund 
families during the events.  In the case of the GS, we find that fund family size is not 
significantly associated with fund returns in the five months following the initial announcement 
in December 2002 to the final settlement in April 2003.  In the case of the trading scandals, we 
find that implicated fund families significantly underperformed other fund families in the six-
month period from September 2003 to February 2004, a period when most announcements 
relating to implicated fund families were made.  Controlling for the performance of the 
implicated fund families, we find no difference in the performance of larger fund families 
relative to smaller fund families during the six-month scandal period.  These results suggest that 
the implicated fund families were affected by the regulatory focus, though this effect did not 
seem to extend to other large fund families.  Further, in the period following the scandals, the 
implicated fund families did not continue to underperform other fund families. 
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Motivated by the fact that large fund families rely on sell-side research and by prior work 
that has found that the recent regulatory events (Reg FD and the GS) had an effect on sell-side 
research from large investment banks (Gintschel and Markov, 2003; Kadan et al., 2008), we 
carry out an additional analysis to test the role that large investment banks played in the 
performance of large fund families. We examine the relationship between fund family size and 
the extent to which fund trades are associated with the direction of forecast revisions of analysts 
from large investment banks.9  We find that in the two-year period immediately preceding Reg 
FD, trades by larger fund families are more positively associated with forecast revisions made by 
analysts from large investment banks than trades by smaller fund families.  This effect, however, 
disappears in the two-year period after the GS, with a significant change between these two 
periods.  These results suggest that Reg FD and the GS jointly have a significant adverse effect 
on large fund family trades based on analyst information from large investment banks.  
Examining the relative effects of Reg FD and the GS, we find that most of the effect is lost 
because of Reg FD, with almost 90% of the overall decline occurring after Reg FD.  In the two 
year period following Reg FD, there is no evidence of a relationship between fund family size 
and the extent to which fund trades are associated with forecast revisions of analysts from large 
investment banks.  This is an interesting finding because it suggests that the large effect of Reg 
FD limited the extent to which the GS could affect large fund family trades.  The decrease in 
weight placed on analysts’ forecast revisions following Reg FD is consistent with prior work that 
finds a significant decline in analysts’ forecast accuracy subsequent to Reg FD (Bailey et al., 
2003; Groysberg et al., 2008). Consistent with Reg FD eliminating most of the fund family size 
effect, the results show only a small decline in this effect around the GS. These results are 
                                                            
9 Large investment banks in our study are defined as the investment banks that were subject to the GS (similar to 
Kadan et al., 2008). 
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consistent with our fund return analyses, which show most of the decline in fund family 
performance occurring around Reg FD.      
While we expect the regulatory changes to have weakened the ability of larger fund 
families to outperform smaller ones, we do not expect the fund family size advantage to 
completely disappear.  Large fund families should have several advantages over small fund 
families: they extensively invest in their research departments, buy proprietary research, have 
access to management at conferences and enjoy a general resource advantage.  If these other 
forms of information advantage truly exist and are significant, we should see persisting, though 
lower, outperformance and stock-picking ability from large fund families in the post-Reg FD 
period.  Our results suggest otherwise, and we can speculate on some possible explanations.  It is 
possible that the size of the fund families makes them difficult to manage, thereby causing 
organizational diseconomies which offset the other advantages.10  The significant information 
advantage enjoyed by large fund families prior to the regulatory changes could have allowed for 
outperformance despite these diseconomies. With the onset of the regulatory changes, the 
benefits of the selective access to management at industry conferences (with some indirect 
disclosure but without significant selective direct disclosure of information from the 
management) might not provide enough of an edge to make a difference.  Given the size of large 
fund families, it is also quite possible that access to proprietary expert networks and consulting 
might not be enough to significantly move the needle on performance for a large fund family.11  
                                                            
10 Chen et al. (2003) examine this argument when explaining the underperformance of large funds relative to small 
funds. 
11 To examine this issue further, we ran a hand-collected data check. We used a method similar to that used in 
Groysberg et al. (2008). We identified the largest fund families based on assets under management (AUM) from 
morningstar.com, as of the end of September 2010.  We excluded fund families that are primarily focused on fixed 
income (e.g., BlackRock and Western Asset), ETFs and Index Funds (e.g., Vanguard), and those within Investment 
Banks (e.g., GSAM).  Morningstar provides information on the 5 year performance percentile ranking of every fund 
on their website (www.morningstar.com) and on Morningstar Direct. We used this data (as of the end of September 
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That said, large fund families have other significant benefits that could still justify their 
usefulness including lower bankruptcy risk, better marketing of their products, education of 
clients and the ability to service and maintain retirement accounts of employees of large 
institutions.  
This paper contributes to the literature on mutual fund performance and the effects of 
recent regulatory changes in six ways.  First, we document that the advantage of fund family size 
on fund performance has waned in recent years.  Second, we find that this change coincides with 
the introduction of the regulatory changes.  Third, we provide evidence that the information 
advantage in the earlier period manifested itself in the ability of funds to forecast correctly and 
buy (sell) stocks with positive (negative) returns around the future earnings announcement date.  
This ability, which existed prior to the regulatory changes, disappeared subsequent to their 
introduction.  Fourth, we provide evidence that Reg FD, in particular, was a significant event that 
caused a decline in the ability of large fund families to outperform.  This is consistent with the 
outperformance of large fund families being related to the extent of selective information flow.  
Fifth, we document that fund families implicated in trading scandals experienced a decline in 
their performance during the scandal period. Finally, we examine the role of large investment 
banks in facilitating the performance of large fund families by documenting the adverse impact 
of Reg FD and the GS on the association between forecast revisions of analysts from large 
investment banks and trades by large fund families. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section I describes the data sources and the 
summary statistics.  Section II describes the benchmark adjusted fund returns and provides 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
2010) to determine the average percentile rank of the funds housed in the top 6 fund families. The average rank is 
50.83.  This suggests that funds with the largest fund families beat 49% of their peers and trailed 51% of their peers, 
which shows they are right in the middle of the pack.  This evidence does not point to any information advantage 
and is consistent with our findings.  
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details on the regression analyses, while section III describes the stock-picking skill analysis.  
Section IV discusses additional analyses, and section V concludes the paper.    
I. Data and Summary Statistics 
        Our primary data source is the CRSP Mutual Fund Database, which provides various fund 
characteristics along with monthly fund returns. While the CRSP Database covers a period from 
1962 to 2008, we use a sample from 1992 to 2008 for our analysis.  This ensures that our 
analysis, which partitions the sample into the pre- and post-Reg FD periods, has an equal number 
of years in each sub-sample.12  Similar to Chen et al. (2004), we restrict our analysis to actively 
managed U.S. equity mutual funds that report monthly returns for at least 12 months.  We 
exclude index, bond, international, and specialized sector funds from our sample by selecting 
mutual funds in the CRSP Mutual Fund Database whose investment objective codes imply that 
they are domestic equity mutual funds.13   
        Table 1 provides summary statistics for the key variables used in the study. In Panel A, we 
report the means and standard deviations of the variables for each fund family size quintile in the 
pre- and post-Reg FD periods. Family size quintile 1 (quintile 5) contains the mutual funds 
                                                            
12 We examine the robustness of our results by using the entire sample period and find similar results.  This is 
discussed further in section II. 
13 To do this, we first select mutual funds whose Wisenberger Fund Type Code (wbrger_obj_cd, available 1961 
through 1991) is  'G',  'GCI', 'LTG',  'MCG',  'SCG',  'G-I',  'G-I-S',  'G-S',  'I-G' or 'I-S-G'. Then, we select mutual 
funds whose Strategic Insight Objective Code (si_obj_cd, available 1992 through 1998) is 'AGG', 'GMC', 'GRI', 
'GRO', 'ING' or 'SCG'. We next select mutual funds whose Lipper Asset Code (lipper_asset_cd, available 1999 
through 2008) is ‘EQ’ and whose Lipper Objective Code (lipper_obj_cd, available 1999 through 2008) is  'CA', 
lipper_obj_cd = 'G', 'GI', 'MC', 'MR', or 'SG'. Finally, we select mutual funds whose Thomson Reuters Wiescat Code 
(tr_wiescat, available in 2008) is 'AGG', 'GCI', 'GRD', 'MID', or 'SMC'.  Similar to Chen et al. (2004) our objective 
is to select domestic equity mutual funds.  However, our selection procedure varies slightly from their method.  
Instead of using the Investment Company Data (ICDI) code (which is not available in the new CRSP database) as 
our initial screening code, we use the Wiesenberger objective code as our starting point.  CRSP Mutual Fund 
Database was reengineered after the publication of Chen et al. (2004). Therefore, we do not have the same mutual 
funds or the same variables analyzed in Chen et al. (2004). For example, Chen et al. (2004) report that they used 
Investment Company Data, Inc. (ICDI) mutual fund objective followed by the Wisenberger objective code to select 
domestic equity mutual funds. However, since the ICDI variable is no longer available in CRSP Mutual Fund 
Database, we use the Wisenberger data. 
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whose family size corresponds to the smallest (largest) 20 percent. The pre-Reg FD (post-Reg 
FD) sample has a monthly average of 369.6 (504.4) fund families. In the pre-Reg FD (post-Reg 
FD) period, family size quintile 1 has a monthly average of 74.3 (101.3) fund families with 91.5 
(139.9) mutual funds, while family size quintile 5 has a monthly average of 73.6 (100.5) fund 
families with 1,126.6 (4,834.7) mutual funds. These statistics suggest that the number of funds 
run by a fund family increase as the size of the fund family increases. For example, in the pre-
Reg FD (post-Reg FD) period, the smallest fund families in quintile 1 actively manage, on 
average, 1.3 (1.4) domestic equity mutual funds, while the largest fund families in quintile 5 
actively manage, on average, 15.4 (48.1) domestic equity mutual funds. In addition, average fund 
size also increases when the fund belongs to larger fund families. For example, in the pre-Reg 
FD (post-Reg FD) period, the mutual funds with the smallest family size have an average TNA 
of $10.35 million ($9.12 million), while the mutual funds with the largest family size have an 
average TNA of $814.87 million ($508.82 million).  
        Panel B of Table 1 reports time-series averages of the cross-sectional correlations between 
various fund characteristics.  Consistent with prior work, LOGFAMSIZE is positively correlated 
with LOGTNA, AGE, and TOTLOAD, and is negatively correlated with EXPRATIO. In the 
post-Reg FD period, LOGFAMSIZE is positively correlated with LOGTNA and TOTLOAD, 
and is negatively correlated with EXPRATIO.  
II. Regression Analysis of Fund Performance 
        To examine the cross-sectional relation between fund family size and fund performance, we 
follow Fama and MacBeth’s (1973) procedure. Specifically, we estimate the following 
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regression in each month and derive time series means and standard deviations of the coefficients 
estimated from the monthly regression: 
(4) FUNDRETi,t = α + β1 LOGFAMSIZEi,t-1 + β2 LOGTNAi,t-1 + β3 TURNOVERi,t-1 + β4 AGEi,t-
1 + β5 EXPRATIOi,t-1 + β6 TOTLOADi,t-1 + β7 FLOWi,t-1 + β8 LAGFUNDRETi,t-1 + εi,t                 
The above regression is estimated twice using two specifications of FUNDRETi,t, gross or net 
monthly fund returns of fund i in month t adjusted by various performance benchmarks. 
Consistent with Chen et al. (2004), we adjust the fund performance by various benchmarks to 
deal with potential heterogeneity in fund styles which might be correlated with fund size and 
fund family size.14 More specifically, in addition to simple market-adjusted returns, we use 
returns adjusted by CAPM, returns adjusted using Fama and French’s (1993) 3-factor model and 
returns adjusted using the 4-factor model in Carhart (1997), which augments the 3-factor model 
with a momentum factor.   Market-adjusted monthly fund return (either gross or net) is monthly 
fund return minus the value-weight return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks (from 
CRSP). Beta-adjusted monthly fund return (either gross or net) is monthly fund return adjusted 
using the CAPM, estimated over the prior 30 months.  Specifically, for each mutual fund in each 
month, using the prior 30 monthly data, we first estimate 
(5) MRETi,t – RF,t = αi + βi MKTRFt + εi,t                 
where MRETi,t  is monthly fund return (either gross or net) of fund i in month t, and RF,t is the 
one-month Treasury bill rate in month t.  MKTRF is the excess return on the market, measured 
                                                            
14 We find that while funds, on average, displayed a preference for growth investing prior to the technology firms 
related market crash and value investing after the crash, the preference is not related to fund size or fund family size.   
Our results are robust to including style as an independent variable. 
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as the value-weighted return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks (from CRSP) minus the 
one-month Treasury bill rate (from Ibbotson Associates). 
Next, we compute the beta-adjusted monthly gross or net fund return of fund i in month t, aˆ i,t, as 
(6) aˆ i,t = MRETi,t – RF,t - bˆ i,t-1 MKTRFt 
where bˆ i,t-1 is the estimated β of fund i in equation (5) using the monthly data from t-30 and t-1. 
The 3 factor-adjusted (4 factor-adjusted) monthly fund return (either gross or net) is the monthly 
fund return adjusted using the 3-factor (4-factor) model, estimated over the prior 30 months. 
Specifically, for each mutual fund in each month, we use the past 30 months of data to estimate: 
(7) MRETi,t – RF,t = αi + βi,1 MKTRFt + βi,2 SMBt + βi,3 HMLt + εi,t                                                    
(8) MRETi,t – RF,t = αi + βi,1 MKTRFt + βi,2 SMBt + βi,3 HMLt + βi,4 UMDt + εi,t                      
SMB is the return on a portfolio of small stocks minus the return on a portfolio of large stocks.  
HML is the return on a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks minus the return on a portfolio of 
low book-to-market returns. UMD is the momentum factor, the return on a portfolio of stocks 
with high prior return (2-12) minus the return on a portfolio of stocks with low prior return (2-
12).15  We compute the 3 factor-adjusted and 4 factor-adjusted monthly gross or net fund return 
of fund i in month t, aˆ i,t, as 
(9) aˆ i,t = MRETi,t – RF,t - bˆ i,t-1,1 MKTRFt - bˆ i,t-1,2 SMBt - bˆ i,t-1,3 HMLt  
(10) aˆ i,t = MRETi,t – RF,t - bˆ i,t-1,1 MKTRFt - bˆ i,t-1,2 SMBt - bˆ i,t-1,3 HMLt  - bˆ i,t-1,4 UMDt 
                                                            
15 All of these factors can be found on Kenneth French’s website. 
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        We restrict our sample to mutual funds with TNA exceeding $15 million.  This screen, 
which is consistent with Chen et al. (2004), is warranted as Elton et al. (2001) report that mutual 
funds with less than $15 million in TNA behave differently from other funds. They find a 
systematic bias in the reported returns of these tiny funds.  
Panel A of Table 2 reports the results of the regression analyses.  Consistent with prior 
work, we find that in the pre-Reg FD period, LOGFAMSIZE is significantly positively 
associated with gross and net fund returns adjusted by the return of market portfolio, beta, 3 
factors and 4 factors, while LOGTNA is significantly negatively associated with gross and net 
fund returns adjusted by all of the same benchmarks.  The coefficient on LOGFAMSIZE, on 
average, is 0.0002. Since one standard deviation of LOGFAMSIZE is 2.50, a one-standard 
deviation shock to family size implies that performance changes by 0.0002 times 2.50, or 5 basis 
points per month (60 basis points per year). Given that our sample of mutual funds 
underperforms the market portfolio by 14 basis points per months (168 basis points per year) 
after fees and expenses, the coefficient on LOGFAMSIZE is not only statistically significant, but 
also economically important.  This finding suggests that, after controlling for fund size, funds 
belonging to larger fund families earn higher returns.  In the post-Reg FD period, 
LOGFAMSIZE is no longer significant for fund returns adjusted by the performance 
benchmarks, while LOGTNA continues to be significantly negative for fund returns adjusted by 
the return of market portfolio, beta and 3 factors.  This finding indicates that the advantage that 
funds enjoyed from large fund family membership no longer exists.  Further, the multivariate 
results suggest that after controlling for fund family size, large mutual funds continue to 
underperform small mutual funds.  These results are consistent with our hypothesis that the 
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mutual funds belonging to larger fund families have been adversely affected by the 
implementation of the regulatory changes.16 
 We carry out an additional analysis by examining whether the average of the monthly 
regression coefficients in the pre-Reg FD period is significantly different from the average of 
those in the post-Reg FD period.  The results of this analysis, which are provided in Panel B of 
Table 2, show that the coefficients on LOGFAMSIZE in the post-Reg FD period are 
significantly smaller than those in the pre-Reg FD period in all eight specifications.  FLOW also 
shows a shift in coefficients in many of the specifications.  The coefficients on FLOW change 
from being negative and significant in the pre-Reg FD period to being insignificant in the post-
Reg FD period.  As an alternative test, we also examine the proportion of monthly coefficients 
that are positive in the pre- and post-Reg FD periods.  The results provided in Panel C of Table 2 
show that between sixty and seventy percent of the coefficients on LOGFAMSIZE are positive 
in the pre-Reg FD period, while the proportion drops to approximately fifty percent in the post-
Reg FD period.  All of these results are consistent with the idea that the regulatory changes 
caused a structural change in the ability of large fund families to outperform.17 
        Figure 1 plots the moving average of the forward 8 year regression coefficients on 
LOGFAMSIZE for the market adjusted returns.  The figure plots data over the entire sample 
period from 1964 to 2008 (excluding 2000, which is the transition year).  To ensure that we do 
not use the coefficients from the post-Reg FD period to calculate the 8 year moving average, the 
number of years used to calculate the average coefficients becomes progressively smaller for 
                                                            
16 In Panel A of Table 2, the number of months in the pre-Reg FD period is 95 (not 96) because our data do not 
provide turnover ratio for the last month in 1991. Thus the monthly regression for January 1992 cannot be run 
because we use the lagged value of this variable as a control variable. 
17 We examine the pre-Reg FD period that covers the entire sample (1963 to 1999).  The results are very similar to 
those documented in Table 2.   
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periods between 1993 and 1999, with the 1999 coefficient representing just one year’s number.  
We apply a similar process to the post-Reg FD period, with the 2001 number representing an 
average of the coefficients from 2001 to 2008 and the 2008 coefficient representing just that 
year’s number.  Figure 1 suggests that the coefficients in the post-Reg FD period (2001 and later) 
are lower than those in the pre-Reg FD period.  Prior to 2001, the moving average coefficient on 
LOGFAMSIZE had never been negative, suggesting a strong and persistent advantage enjoyed 
by the larger fund families.  In the eight years after the regulatory changes, this advantage has 
clearly disappeared. 
III. The Analysis of Mutual Fund Managers’ Stock-Picking Skill 
        The second approach we take to examine the effect of regulatory changes on family size 
advantage is to examine the stock picking skill of mutual fund managers.  Stock picking skill is 
measured using the approach detailed in Baker et al. (2009).  First, we examine whether stock 
picking skill is related to fund family size in the period prior to the regulatory changes.  We then 
determine if this skill persists subsequent to introduction of the regulatory changes.  This is a 
more direct approach to examining the information advantage story proposed in this paper.  If 
stock picking skill is solely the result of better analytical skills and resources enjoyed by large 
fund families, we should find no change in the stock picking ability subsequent to regulatory 
changes (post-Reg FD period).   
        To measure the stock-picking skill, we need to know the particular stocks that each mutual 
fund holds, and, therefore, use a different database, CDA/Spectrum S12 (‘S-one-two’) provided 
by Thomson Financial. Following Baker et al. (2009), we measure mutual fund managers’ stock 
picking skill using the earnings announcement returns of the stocks they trade. Baker et al. 
19 
 
(2009) measure stock picking skill by associating the trading skill with the ability to buy stocks 
that will enjoy high returns and the ability to sell stocks that will suffer low returns at the time of 
upcoming quarterly earnings announcement. By using this approach, Baker et al. (2009) find that 
the average mutual fund displays stock-picking skill in that the subsequent earnings 
announcement returns on stocks whose portfolio weight increased is significantly higher than 
those on stocks whose portfolio weight decreased.  
We first merge the S12 dataset with earnings announcement dates (RDQ) from the 
CRSP/Compustat merged fundamental quarterly database. Specifically, for each mutual fund-
report date-holding observation, we use the first earnings announcement date that immediately 
follows the holdings’ report date. Similar to Baker et al. (2009), we drop observations for which 
we were not able to find earnings announcement date within a quarter after the report date. We 
also drop observations whose report date is distant from the previous report date by more than a 
quarter. The data is then merged with earnings announcement returns data for each holding-
earnings announcement date observation. 
        To compute the earnings announcement return of a stock, we first accumulate the daily 
return of the stock over the (-1, +1) day window centered on the earnings announcement date. 
This is the raw earnings announcement return.  







r ti , 
where i indexes stocks and t measures days around the earnings announcement of stock i.18 
                                                            
18 For earnings announcement dates whose daily returns are not available from CRSP, we used the daily returns of 
the next day or the day after the next as the daily returns of the earnings announcement dates (t = 0).  
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We adjust the raw earnings announcement return for size and book-to-market. To compute this 
benchmark-adjusted earnings announcement return, each stock was matched to one of 25 
benchmark portfolios by quintiles of size and book-to-market.19 Then, for each benchmark 
portfolio in each calendar quarter, we compute the value-weighted average of the raw earnings 
announcement return.  Following this approach, a stock’s benchmark-adjusted earnings 
announcement return is the raw earnings announcement return of the stock minus the value-
weighted average of the raw earnings announcement returns of the matching portfolio.  

















l rwr , 
where l indexes the matched stocks within the quarter where t equals zero, wl is the market value 
weight of stock l in the characteristics-matched portfolio, and sl measures days around the 
earnings announcement of stock l within the matched quarter. 
Similarly, we also compute the earnings announcement return adjusted for size, book-to-
market, and momentum. To compute this return, we match each stock to one of 125 benchmark 
portfolios by quintiles of size, book-to-market, and momentum. We define momentum as the 
sum of the raw earnings announcement returns accumulated over the 3 days in the past 4 
earnings announcements. 
                                                            
19 The composition of the 25 portfolios is based on each firm’s size and book-to-market. We use breakpoints data of 
size and book-to-market downloaded from 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html#Breakpoints. The size breakpoints for 
year t are the NYSE firms’ market value of equity quintiles at the end of June of t. The market value of equity is 
price times shares outstanding. The book-to-market for June of year t is the book value of equity for the last fiscal 
year end in t-1 divided by the market value of equity for December of t-1. The book-to-market breakpoints are 
NYSE quintiles. The portfolios are then constructed at the end of each June. These are the intersections of 5 
portfolios formed on size (i.e., market value of equity) and 5 portfolios formed on book-to-market. The benchmark 




        After merging the mutual fund holding data with each holding’s earnings announcement 
return, for each mutual fund-report date, we next compute equal-weighted average earnings 
announcement returns of holdings in which the mutual fund increased or decreased its ownership 
during the reporting period (i.e., the period between the previous report date and current report 
date), immediately followed by the earnings announcement.20 



















lti rwrI , 
where BAR j is mutual fund-report date j’s equal-weighted average benchmark-adjusted earnings 
announcement returns of stocks in which the mutual fund increased (or decreased) its ownership 
during the reporting period, and i indexes stocks in which the mutual fund increased (or 
decreased) its ownership during reporting period. 
        We finally compute the stock-picking skill of a mutual fund manager as the difference 
between average BAR of stocks in which the mutual fund increased its ownership and those of 
stocks in which the mutual fund decreased its ownership. Thus, if the difference is significantly 
positive, it indicates that the average returns of stocks that the mutual fund buys are higher than 
those of stocks that it sells. We interpret this as evidence that the mutual fund manager possesses 
stock picking skill. However, if the difference is not significantly positive, it indicates that the 
mutual fund manager does not have stock picking skill. This measure of stock picking skill 
mitigates Fama’s (1970) joint hypothesis problem because unobserved risk premium is 
                                                            
20 A mutual fund’s ownership in a stock is computed as the number of shares of the stock that the mutual fund holds 
divided by the number of shares of the stock outstanding.  
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differenced away by comparing the earnings announcement returns of stocks that the mutual 
fund buys with those of stocks that it sells.21 
       Similar to the earlier analyses using CRSP Mutual Fund Database, we restrict the analysis of 
stock-picking skill to actively-managed US equity funds with fund size greater than $15 
million.22  After matching with subsequent earnings announcement returns, this procedure results 
in 22,597 mutual fund-report date observations (1,610 unique mutual funds) in the pre-Reg FD 
period and 19,065 mutual fund-report date observations (1,451 unique mutual funds) in the post-
Reg FD period. The sample covers a period from 1980 to 2006.  We carry out analyses using the 
entire sample period as well as the reduced sample period from 1994 to 2006 (to ensure equal 
number of observations in the pre and post periods).   
        Panels A and B of Table 3 report the stock-picking skill of mutual fund managers across 
fund family size quintiles. BAR1 is the stock-picking skill measured using benchmark-adjusted 
earnings announcement returns adjusted for size and book-to-market. BAR2 is the stock-picking 
skill measured using benchmark-adjusted earnings announcement returns adjusted for size, book-
to-market, and momentum. Panel A shows that, in both the full and reduced pre-Reg FD periods, 
mutual funds as a whole, on average, have significantly positive stock-picking skills (i.e., 
significantly positive BAR1 and BAR2). However, in the post-Reg FD period, there is no 
evidence of significant stock-picking skills. Panel B confirms that the drop in overall stock-
picking skills is statistically significant. In addition, Panel B shows that only in the largest family 
size quintile (quintile 5), do mutual funds show a significant decline in stock-picking skills. As is 
                                                            
21 Baker et al. (2009) note that focusing on trades of stocks by funds has following advantages relative to studying 
holdings of stocks by funds: (1) comparing the subsequent returns of stocks that funds buy with those they sell 
differences away unobserved risk premia and thus reduces joint hypothesis problem, (2) given that trading incurs 
transaction costs, trades of stocks are likelier to be driven by new information than an ongoing holding of stocks. 
22 We include mutual funds in the sample whose investment objective code is “aggressive growth (IOC=2),” 
“growth (IOC=3),” or “growth and income (IOC=4),” as reported in the S12. 
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reported in Panel A, in the pre-Reg FD period, mutual funds in the largest family size quintile 
exhibit significantly positive stock-picking skills.  However, in the post-Reg FD period, there is 
no evidence of significant stock-picking skills.  
        Interestingly, Panel A shows that mutual funds in the smallest family size quintile exhibit 
the highest stock-picking skill amongst all quintiles in both pre- and post-Reg FD periods.  
However, Panel B shows that, unlike the largest family size quintile, the difference in stock-
picking skills between the pre and post-Reg FD periods is not significant in the smallest family 
size quintile.  Thus, while the regulatory changes affected the largest fund families, they did not 
have any effect on the smallest fund families, which is consistent with our hypothesis.  While the 
highest stock-picking skills of the smallest family size quintile (in Panel A) might seem 
incongruous, these results are driven by the use of a univariate analysis that does not control for 
fund size.  Consistent with prior research that has shown that fund size is negatively associated 
with fund performance (Chen et al., 2003), the evidence of high stock-picking skill displayed in 
the smallest fund families is possibly related to their small fund size (see Panel A of Table 1).  
Controlling for fund size, we expect larger fund families to exhibit higher stock-picking skills in 
the pre-Reg FD period with no difference in stock-picking skills in the post-Reg FD period.  
Panel C of Table 3 reports the Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression results when stock-
picking skill is regressed on family size and fund size in each quarter. LOGFAMSIZE is the 
natural logarithm of fund family size, which is the sum of market value of the portfolios held by 
all member funds of the fund family. LOGFUNDSIZE is the natural logarithm of fund size, 
which is the market value of the portfolio held by the fund measured at the beginning of the year. 
Results show that in the pre-Reg FD period, LOGFAMSIZE is strongly significantly positively 
associated with BAR1 and marginally significant with BAR2, while LOGFUNDSIZE is 
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significantly negatively associated with both BAR1 and BAR2.  These results confirm that the 
highest stock-picking skill of the smallest fund families in Panel A is attributable to fund size. 
That is, in the pre-Reg FD period, the mutual funds in larger fund families have superior stock-
picking skill compared to those in smaller fund families, once we control for fund size.  
However, in the post-Reg FD period, LOGFAMSIZE is insignificantly negative for BAR1 and 
BAR2.   
        Panel D of Table 3 tests the difference in quarterly coefficients from the above Fama-
MacBeth (1973) regressions between the pre- and post-Reg FD periods. The change in the 
coefficients on LOGFAMSIZE is negative and significant using both the expanded and reduced 
pre-periods.  The decrease in these coefficients is consistent with the decline in stock picking 
ability of large fund families after the regulatory changes.  The change in coefficients on 
LOGFUNDSIZE is not significant in any of the four specifications, which lends further support 
to the effect of regulatory changes on family size advantage.  Finally, Panel E examines the 
proportion of quarterly coefficients that are positive from the above Fama-MacBeth (1973) 
regressions in the pre- and post-Reg FD periods.  For the coefficients on LOGFAMSIZE, the 
proportion drops from between 56% and 67% in the pre-period to between 42% and 46% in the 
post-period.  This finding points to a large decrease in the stock-picking ability of large fund 
families. 
IV. Additional Analyses 
4.1. Short-Horizon Return Analysis 
           The results in Table 2 are based on a sample of sixteen years (8 years prior to Reg FD and 
8 years subsequent to Reg FD) and are consistent with regulatory changes having an effect on 
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fund family performance. We also attempt to examine the extent to which the decline in the 
ability of large fund families to outperform was affected by each of the events (i.e., Reg FD, the 
GS, and trading scandals).  To isolate the effect of each event and to avoid contamination from 
other events (to the extent possible), we examine the performance of fund families immediately 
surrounding the events and during the events.23   
          In Table 4, we estimate the Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions using a sample of two years 
around the adoption of Reg FD (1 year prior to and 1 year subsequent to Reg FD).  This sample 
period ends prior to the GS and prior to the announcement of the trading scandals.  Despite the 
small sample size, the results on LOGFAMSIZE are reasonably strong.  Panel A of Table 4 
shows that in the year immediately prior to Reg FD (i.e., 1999), the coefficients on 
LOGFAMSIZE range from 0.0003 to 0.0004 and are significantly positive in all the 
specifications.  Given that the standard deviation of LOGFAMSIZE for this two-year-period 
sample is 2.44, these coefficients translate into a 7 to 10-basis point-per-month difference in fund 
returns for a one-standard deviation change in family size, which is economically very 
significant. In contrast, in the year immediately after Reg FD (i.e., 2001), the coefficients are 
negative and not significant in all eight specifications.  Despite the small sample size, LOGTNA 
is negative and significant in some of the specifications in the both periods.   
          Panel B of Table 4 shows that the differences in coefficients on LOGFAMSIZE between 
the two years are negative in all eight specifications and significant in four of the eight 
specifications.  As with the prior Tables, the differences in coefficients on FLOW between the 
two years are significantly positive in some of the eight specifications. In addition, the 
                                                            
23 The limitation of this analysis is the small sample sizes (between 5 and 12 monthly observations in each period) 
which provide low statistical power to reject the null. 
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differences in coefficients on TURNOVER between the two years are significantly negative in 
all specifications. One possible explanation for this finding is that in the year prior to Reg FD, 
turnover was more likely to be driven by selective disclosure and was, therefore, more associated 
with fund returns than in the year after Reg FD.  Panel C of Table 4 shows that in the year prior 
to Reg FD, between 67 and 83 percent of the monthly coefficients on LOGFAMSIZE are 
positive while this drops to between 33 and 50 percent in the year subsequent to Reg FD.  These 
results support the possibility that Reg FD had a large impact on the relation between fund 
family size and fund performance by restricting selective disclosure of firm information.  
 Given that the GS and the trading scandals occurred within a few months of each other, 
we examine the effect of the two events together.  Using the Fama-MacBeth (1973) approach, 
we compare the coefficients on LOGFAMSIZE for the year ending prior to the initial 
announcement of the GS with the coefficients on the same variable for the year after the scandals 
(results untabulated).  Results show that the coefficients on LOGFAMSIZE are not significant in 
either of these years.  Further, unlike the short horizon around Reg FD, there is no significant 
shift in the effect of fund family size on fund performance.  One reason for this result could be 
that the effect of these two events are not as strong as the effect of Reg FD and, therefore, the 
small sample size makes it difficult to isolate this effect.  It is also likely that large fund families 
were able to quickly offset any negative effects of the GS and the scandals by taking appropriate 
corrective actions including increasing their investment in in-house research.   
 While there is no discernible difference in relative performance of large fund families in 
the period surrounding the two events, we also examine the relative performance of large fund 
families in general and the implicated fund families in particular during the events (results 
untabulated). Using the Fama-MacBeth (1973) approach, we examine the five months 
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encompassing the GS (December 2002 to April 2003), and find that the coefficients on 
LOGFAMSIZE are not significant, suggesting that there is no discernible difference in fund 
performance across fund family size during the GS period. When focusing on the six months 
encompassing the scandals (September 2003 to February 2004), we include an additional 
independent variable, SCANDAL, which is an indicator variable for the fund families implicated 
in the scandals.  Results show that the coefficients on SCANDAL are negative for all 
specifications and significant for six specifications, suggesting that the implicated fund families 
were significantly affected by the scandals.  The coefficients on LOGFAMSIZE are not 
significant, which indicates that after controlling for the poor performance of the implicated fund 
families, we cannot identify a difference in fund performance across fund families with various 
sizes during the scandal period.24 These results suggest that the implicated fund families were 
affected by the regulatory focus though this effect did not seem to extend to other large fund 
families.  Additional results show that the significant coefficient on SCANDAL did not exist 
before the scandal period or persist after the period. 
4.2. Fund Trades, Fund Family Membership and Analysts’ Forecast Revisions 
The analyses thus far have focused on the effect of regulatory changes on the relation 
between fund family size and fund performance.  While the earlier analyses focusing on fund 
performance reveal the overall effect of the regulatory changes on all sources of an information 
advantage to fund families, we carry out an additional analysis to focus on one specific source of 
the information advantage, in particular, large investment banks.   
                                                            
24 When we compare the event period coefficients to the pre- and post-event coefficients, the differences in 
coefficients are all insignificant (untabulated). 
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We examine how the changes in the holdings of mutual funds are related to forecast 
revisions of analysts in the large investment banks affected by the GS. If these analysts had an 
information advantage and disclosed this information to large fund families prior to releasing it 
to other market participants, we would expect greater frequency of trades consistent with analyst 
information made by large fund families.  More specifically, we use the forecast of quarterly 
earnings for the U.S. firms issued by analysts in the large investment banks affected by the GS. 
These were obtained from the IBES Detail History data file.  We define the analyst forecast 
revision for a stock to be 1 (-1) if the median earnings forecast issued during the last month in 
quarter t is higher (lower) than the median earnings forecast issued during the last month in 
quarter t-1. If there is no change in median analyst earnings forecast between quarters, the 
analyst forecast revision takes a value of zero.  We then merge this information with our mutual 
fund holdings data to compute the revision score (REVSCORE) of each mutual fund-quarter.25  
Analogous to our measure of stock picking skill, we compute the REVSCORE of a 
mutual fund as the difference between the average analyst forecast revision of stocks in which 
the mutual fund increased its ownership and those of stocks in which the mutual funds decreased 
its ownership.  Thus, if REVSCORE is positive, it implies that the mutual fund trades are 
consistent with the revision in analysts’ earnings forecasts.  The greater the REVSCORE, the 
more the fund or the fund family trades in the direction of the analysts’ forecast revision.  We 
carry out a regression analysis with REVSCORE as the dependent variable and LOGFAMSIZE 
                                                            
25 Ideally we would like to examine trades in the period (days or weeks) prior to the public forecast revision, but 
mutual funds holding information is available only on a quarterly basis which makes this kind of analysis impossible.  
However, our proxy (quarterly change in holdings) is still an effective proxy since there is no reason to believe that 
large fund families should trade more than small fund families once the revision is publicly announced.  In other 
words, our measure makes it more difficult to find the effect we are examining and any difference in trading 
behavior that we document is likely to be because of our information leakage argument.  Further, given that the 
advantage is derived from information leakage that occurs a few days or weeks prior to the revision, examining the 
change in the following quarter holdings is not effective. 
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and LOGFUNDSIZE as the independent variables.  Similar to the analyses of fund returns and 
stock-picking skill, we restrict the analysis of REVSCORE to actively-managed US equity funds 
with fund size greater than $15 million. 
In Table 5, the analyses are carried out over three time periods with the Fama-MacBeth 
(1973) approach using quarterly data.  Period 1 covers the two years prior to Reg FD (1998-
1999).  Period 2 cover the intervening two years between Reg FD and the GS (2001-2002) and 
Period 3 covers the two years after the GS (2004-2005).  As expected in Period 1, the coefficient 
on LOGFAMSIZE is positive and highly significant, which is consistent with trades by large 
fund families being more associated with forecast revisions of analysts from large investment 
banks as compared with trades by small fund families.  In Period 2, the coefficient on 
LOGFAMSIZE is much smaller when compared with Period 1 and is not significant.  This is an 
interesting finding in that it suggests that Reg FD may have eliminated the reliance of large fund 
families on forecast revisions of analysts from large investment banks.  In Period 3, the 
coefficient on LOGFAMSIZE is not significant.   
The difference in the coefficients between Periods 1 and 3 is negative and significant, 
suggesting that Reg FD and the GS jointly had a significant adverse impact on the extent to 
which large fund families trade on forecast revisions of analysts from large investment banks.  
Examining the differences in the coefficients between Periods 1 and 2 and Periods 2 and 3, we 
find that most of the decline occurred around Reg FD.  However, given that the sample size is 
only 8 quarters in our Fama-MacBeth (1973) approach, the differences are not statistically 
significant.   
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Once we control for fund family size (LOGFAMSIZE), fund size (LOGFUNDSIZE) 
does not seem to have additional association with REVSCORE in Period 2.  However, in Periods 
1 and 3, the coefficient on LOGFUNDSIZE is negative and significant.  This suggests that after 
controlling for fund family size, larger funds place less emphasis on analysts’ forecast revision in 
Periods 1 and 3.  While we are not quite sure as to why this is the case, we conjecture that 
analysts’ forecast revision may possess some information for smaller funds that trade in smaller 
stocks, thereby causing them to place more emphasis on analysts’ forecast revisions. 
4.3. Controlling for Fund Size  
Panel B of Table 1 shows that the correlation between fund size and fund family size 
reduced from the pre- to the post-Reg FD period.  Though we include fund size in our analysis as 
a control variable, it is possible that a misspecification of the fund size relation with returns 
could be reflected in the observed family size effect (because of the correlation between the two 
variables).  However, given the prior findings that smaller funds outperform larger funds (Chen, 
Hong, Huang and Kubik, 2004; Pollet and Wilson, 2008), the drop in the correlation (resulting 
from a decrease in average fund size of the large fund families after Reg FD) should work 
against our hypothesis because then we should see the relative performance of large fund 
families improve after Reg FD, rather than diminish.  Nonetheless, to provide further assurance, 
we adopt several alternative approaches to address any potential misspecification in fund size 
(results untabulated).  First, we use a matched sample approach based on fund size and fund 
family size, matching funds and fund families one year prior to Reg FD with funds and fund 
families one year after Reg FD.  The purpose of this approach is to examine a subsample of fund 
families whose member funds have comparable size across the two sample periods.  We find that 
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the results from this approach are consistent with those in earlier analyses.26  As an alternative 
approach, we also implement a two stage approach. We first carry out a polynomial regression of 
fund family size on a quartic model of fund size (adding square, cube and fourth power of fund 
size).  The residual from this regression (which is uncorrelated with various transformations of 
fund size) is then replaced in the main regression in the place of fund family size. The results and 
conclusions are unaffected by using this method.  Finally, we examine Belsley, Kuh and Welsch 
(1980) condition indices and find no evidence that collinearity between fund size and fund 
family size is an issue.   
V. Conclusion 
        The last decade has witnessed several changes to the regulatory landscape with significant 
implications for the mutual fund industry.  The changes have included a reduction in the 
selective access to firm information (Reg FD), a decline in the quality of sell-side analyst 
research at large investment banks (Reg FD and the GS), and the increased regulatory scrutiny of 
fund families focused on limiting the provision of late trading and market timing opportunities to 
                                                            
26 The matched pre-Reg FD sample consists of fund families in the year prior to Reg FD (1999) whose member 
funds have comparable size to the funds in the year after Reg FD (2001). We first compute a fund family’s average 
fund size by dividing family size by the number of its member funds and, then, find a matched sample by adopting 
an iterative approach as follows. We begin with the first month of the pre-Reg FD period (January 1999) and locate 
a sub-sample of fund families in that month that are matched to fund families in the first month of the post-Reg FD 
period (January 2001).  A match occurs if (1) its average fund size deviates from the average fund size of a fund 
family in January 2001 by less than 5% and (2) the family size quintiles it belongs to is the same as the family size 
quintile of the matched fund family in January 2001. A regression using this sub-sample provides us with the first 
set of coefficients.  We then repeat this approach by focusing on another subsample match between the first month 
of the pre-Reg FD period (January 1999) and the second month of the post-Reg FD period (February 2001), which 
yields the second set of coefficients.  Because our matching periods span 12 months, repeating this approach till the 
end of the sample period provides us with 12 sets of coefficients for the first month of the pre-Reg FD period 
(January 1999).  These are then averaged using a procedure similar to the Fama-Macbeth approach, producing the 
coefficients on each variable for the first month (January 1999). Repeating this approach provides us with 12 
monthly coefficients for the pre-Reg FD period, which are then averaged.  Similarly, the matched post-Reg FD 
sample consists of fund families in the post-Reg FD period (2001) whose member funds have comparable size to the 
funds in each month of the pre-Reg FD period (1999). Using a similar procedure to the one described above, we 
generate matched coefficients for each month in the post-Reg FD period. Results are not changed when we use the 
full sample period (8-year pre-Reg FD period and 8-year post-Reg FD period). 
32 
 
select clients (trading scandals).  We examine the effect of these regulatory changes on the 
previously documented finding that fund family size is beneficial to the performance of a mutual 
fund.  We find that the beneficial effects of fund family size on fund performance disappeared 
subsequent to the regulatory changes.  We further find that after controlling for fund size, funds 
belonging to larger fund families had better stock-picking ability in the period prior to the 
regulatory changes and that this ability faded subsequently.  One argument suggests that since 
mutual funds and analysts enjoyed an information advantage through selective disclosure of 
information by firms, regulators chose to restrict this flow through the enactment of Regulation 
FD.  Our finding supports the information advantage explanation and reduces the likelihood of 
alternative explanations such as greater analytical skill and cost economies of scale. An 
additional analysis suggests that fund families implicated in trading scandals experienced a 
decline in their performance during the scandal period.   
We also examine the role of large investment banks in providing an advantage to large 
fund families.  We find that family size was positively associated with the extent to which funds 
traded in the same direction as forecast revisions by analysts from large investment banks in the 
period prior to Reg FD and the GS, and this association declined significantly after the two 
regulatory events.  The findings also call into question the performance benefits of fund family 
size (although other benefits, such as lower bankruptcy risk, better marketing of products and 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Panel A. Time-series averages of cross-sectional averages and standard deviations across fund 
family size quintiles 
Pre-Reg FD Period (1992 to 1999) 
1 2 3 4 5
Number of Families 74.3 73.9 74.0 73.9 73.6 369.6
Number of Funds 91.5 136.8 206.6 385.7 1126.6 1947.2
TNA 10.35 44.74 98.46 202.69 814.87 511.60
    ($ million) (10.04) (46.06) (131.88) (382.13) (2719.64) (2086.86)
LOGTNA 1.68 3.00 3.48 3.80 4.60 4.02
(1.39) (1.63) (1.85) (2.14) (2.42) (2.36)
LOGFAMSIZE 2.33 4.69 6.23 7.69 10.17 8.40
(1.12) (0.49) (0.41) (0.40) (1.15) (2.50)
TURNOVER 111.26 92.23 76.82 82.45 79.39 81.90
    (% per year) (215.33) (110.68) (71.88) (110.11) (65.54) (98.23)
AGE 8.55 7.50 6.99 8.17 8.44 8.12
    (years) (10.56) (8.40) (7.95) (9.58) (9.71) (9.45)
EXPRATIO 2.23 1.53 1.38 1.33 1.30 1.38
    (% per year) (2.57) (0.61) (0.55) (0.52) (0.58) (0.84)
TOTLOAD 1.21 1.63 2.63 2.76 3.69 3.11
    (%) (2.26) (3.15) (4.07) (4.08) (4.93) (4.55)
FLOW 74.43 92.36 113.07 121.85 124.78 118.03
    (% per year) (251.52) (278.63) (331.88) (344.22) (340.62) (336.73)
GFUNDRET -0.08 -0.11 -0.04 0.00 -0.02 -0.03
    (% per month) (3.14) (2.70) (2.33) (2.55) (2.17) (2.42)
NFUNDRET -0.27 -0.22 -0.15 -0.11 -0.12 -0.14
    (% per month) (3.15) (2.70) (2.34) (2.55) (2.17) (2.42)
Post-Reg FD Period (2001 to 2008)
1 2 3 4 5
Number of Families 101.3 100.9 100.9 100.9 100.5 504.4
Number of Funds 139.9 226.7 454.4 1033.2 4834.7 6688.9
TNA 9.12 37.17 79.44 161.82 508.82 397.52
    ($ million) (8.23) (45.87) (148.36) (441.10) (2595.88) (2216.03)
LOGTNA 1.55 2.56 2.77 2.95 3.43 3.23
(1.45) (1.82) (2.18) (2.44) (2.72) (2.63)
LOGFAMSIZE 2.27 4.68 6.36 8.17 10.89 9.76
(1.12) (0.60) (0.45) (0.49) (1.24) (2.31)
TURNOVER 140.59 113.76 93.83 112.56 90.21 95.84
    (% per year) (256.63) (195.18) (120.49) (197.34) (93.46) (133.65)
AGE 7.92 7.51 7.25 7.62 7.10 7.21
    (years) (8.97) (7.06) (6.42) (7.20) (7.01) (7.05)
EXPRATIO 2.60 1.81 1.50 1.54 1.40 1.47
    (% per year) (5.29) (0.81) (0.60) (0.57) (0.66) (1.06)
TOTLOAD 2.51 3.03 4.00 4.43 4.61 4.45
    (%) (2.60) (3.87) (5.04) (5.24) (5.15) (5.12)
FLOW 29.79 43.99 41.74 58.24 83.10 73.82
    (% per year) (152.16) (188.36) (173.14) (220.09) (266.82) (251.69)
GFUNDRET 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.04 0.04 0.05
    (% per month) (3.26) (2.81) (2.51) (2.38) (2.00) (2.18)
NFUNDRET -0.18 -0.06 -0.03 -0.09 -0.07 -0.08
    (% per month) (3.33) (2.80) (2.48) (2.39) (2.00) (2.19)
Fund Family Size Quintile






Panel B. Time-series averages of (monthly) correlations between fund characteristics  
Pre-Reg FD Period (1992 to 1999) 
TNA LOGTNA LOGFAMSIZE TURNOVER AGE EXPRATIO TOTLOAD FLOW
TNA 1.00 0.42 0.24 -0.04 0.31 -0.14 -0.01 -0.06
LOGTNA 1.00 0.39 -0.06 0.46 -0.34 -0.01 -0.16
LOGFAMSIZE 1.00 -0.04 0.05 -0.23 0.16 0.02
TURNOVER 1.00 -0.03 0.15 0.00 0.02
AGE 1.00 -0.13 -0.07 -0.21
EXPRATIO 1.00 0.28 0.06
TOTLOAD 1.00 0.09
FLOW 1.00
Post-Reg FD Period (2001 to 2008)
TNA LOGTNA LOGFAMSIZE TURNOVER AGE EXPRATIO TOTLOAD FLOW
TNA 1.00 0.34 0.15 -0.06 0.32 -0.10 -0.04 -0.04
LOGTNA 1.00 0.21 -0.11 0.45 -0.23 -0.04 -0.08
LOGFAMSIZE 1.00 -0.09 0.00 -0.19 0.06 0.05
TURNOVER 1.00 -0.04 0.15 -0.02 0.01
AGE 1.00 -0.03 -0.07 -0.20
EXPRATIO 1.00 0.23 -0.03
TOTLOAD 1.00 -0.04
FLOW 1.00  
Notes: “Number of Funds” is the number of mutual funds that meet our sample selection criteria. For a 
fund to be in our sample, it must be an actively managed U.S. equity mutual fund and have information 
on monthly returns at least for 12 months. TNA is the total net assets under management in millions of 
dollars. LOGTNA is the natural logarithm of TNA. LOGFAMSIZE is the natural logarithm of the sum of 
total net assets under management of the funds in the fund family that the fund belongs to. TURNOVER 
is fund turnover ratio as provided by CRSP Mutual Fund Database, defined as the minimum of 
aggregated sales or aggregated purchases of securities, the minimum divided by the average 12-month 
TNA of the fund. AGE is the number of months divided by 12 since the establishment of the fund. 
EXPRATIO is expense ratio as of the most recently completed fiscal year, as provided by CRSP Mutual 
Fund Database, defined as the ratio of total investment that shareholders pay for the fund’s operating 
expenses including 12b-1 fees and adjusted for waivers and reimbursements. TOTLOAD is front-end load 
(maximum sales charges at each investment breakpoint) averaged across each breakpoint plus deferred 
and rear-end load (maximum fees charged when withdrawing funds). FLOW is the percentage of new 
fund flows into the mutual fund over the past 12 months, defined as the fund’s TNA in month t minus the 
product of the fund’s TNA in month t-12 with the sum of one and the net fund returns compounded 
between months t -12 and t, all divided by the fund’s TNA in month t-12. FLOW is Winsorized at the top 
two percent in each pre- and post-Reg FD sample because very tiny TNA in month t-12 in denominator 
relative to the fund’s TNA in month t inflates the value of FLOW greatly. TNA, LOGFAMSIZE, and 
FLOW are reported monthly. All other fund characteristics are reported once a year. GFUNDRET is the 
market-adjusted monthly gross fund return, and NFUNDRET is the market-adjusted monthly net fund 
return. Monthly gross fund return is calculated by adding back the expense ratio divided by 12 to monthly 
net fund return. In Panel A, family size quintile 1 has 20 percent of the mutual funds whose family size is 
smallest and family size quintile 5 has 20 percent of mutual funds whose family size is largest. 
Corresponding standard deviations are parenthesized.  
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Table 2. Regression of Fund Performance from 1992 to 2008 
Panel A. Results of regression analysis 
Pre-Reg FD Period (1992 to 1999) 
Market-Adj Beta-Adj 3-Factor 4-Factor Market-Adj Beta-Adj 3-Factor 4-Factor
INTERCEPT -0.0038 -0.0022 -0.0018 0.0003 -0.0038 -0.0021 -0.0018 0.0004
-(1.34) -(0.79) -(1.06) (0.19) -(1.35) -(0.78) -(1.04) (0.25)
LOGFAMSIZEi, t-1 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001
(3.50) (2.97) (1.91) (2.23) (3.52) (2.99) (1.88) (2.19)
LOGTNAi, t-1 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0003
-(3.97) -(3.40) -(1.72) -(2.95) -(3.96) -(3.48) -(1.72) -(2.91)
TURNOVERi, t-1 0.000007 0.000002 0.000006 0.000000 0.000007 0.000002 0.000006 0.000000
(1.26) (0.35) (1.36) (0.02) (1.26) (0.34) (1.39) (0.09)
AGEi, t-1 -0.000005 -0.000005 -0.000018 -0.000019 -0.000005 -0.000002 -0.000016 -0.000018
-(0.36) -(0.40) -(1.52) -(1.66) -(0.36) -(0.18) -(1.46) -(1.65)
EXPRATIOi, t-1 -0.0001 -0.0005 0.0005 0.0000 -0.0009 -0.0014 -0.0004 -0.0009
-(0.12) -(0.62) (1.12) (0.08) -(1.07) -(1.63) -(0.93) -(2.23)
TOTLOADi, t-1 0.000028 0.000014 -0.000037 -0.000034 0.000028 0.000017 -0.000035 -0.000028
(0.67) (0.35) -(1.77) -(1.50) (0.65) (0.40) -(1.66) -(1.21)
FLOWi, t-1 -0.000001 -0.000003 -0.000003 -0.000003 -0.000001 -0.000002 -0.000002 -0.000002
-(0.98) -(2.80) -(2.97) -(3.19) -(0.97) -(2.65) -(2.46) -(2.49)
LAGFUNDRETi, t-1 0.0163 0.0192 0.0108 0.0086 0.0163 0.0191 0.0107 0.0084
(1.89) (2.29) (2.14) (1.60) (1.89) (2.28) (2.12) (1.58)
No. of months 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95
Post-Reg FD Period (2001 to 2008)
Market-Adj Beta-Adj 3-Factor 4-Factor Market-Adj Beta-Adj 3-Factor 4-Factor
INTERCEPT 0.0016 -0.0001 0.0009 0.0003 0.0016 -0.0002 0.0009 0.0002
(0.75) -(0.07) (0.82) (0.28) (0.74) -(0.14) (0.80) (0.20)
LOGFAMSIZEi, t-1 -0.000010 -0.000046 -0.000028 -0.000030 -0.000008 -0.000044 -0.000022 -0.000024
-(0.20) -(0.75) -(0.68) -(0.63) -(0.17) -(0.72) -(0.56) -(0.55)
LOGTNAi, t-1 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001
-(3.29) -(2.61) -(1.76) -(1.31) -(3.28) -(2.42) -(1.84) -(1.27)
TURNOVERi, t-1 0.000000 -0.000001 -0.000004 -0.000007 0.000000 -0.000001 -0.000004 -0.000006
-(0.12) -(0.37) -(1.11) -(2.64) -(0.12) -(0.20) -(1.05) -(2.61)
AGEi, t-1 -0.000001 -0.000006 0.000003 0.000010 0.000000 -0.000007 0.000002 0.000009
-(0.05) -(0.51) (0.26) (1.00) -(0.04) -(0.56) (0.23) (0.86)
EXPRATIOi, t-1 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0009 -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0008
-(0.05) (0.47) (0.18) (0.23) -(2.64) -(2.39) -(3.88) -(3.71)
TOTLOADi, t-1 -0.000017 -0.000044 -0.000016 -0.000011 -0.000017 -0.000043 -0.000016 -0.000013
-(0.78) -(2.09) -(1.49) -(1.03) -(0.75) -(2.09) -(1.61) -(1.17)
FLOWi, t-1 0.000000 0.000001 0.000000 0.000001 0.000000 0.000001 0.000000 0.000001
-(0.41) (0.73) (0.07) (0.68) -(0.41) (1.17) (0.49) (0.99)
LAGFUNDRETi, t-1 0.0194 0.0098 0.0077 0.0039 0.0194 0.0096 0.0074 0.0035
(2.04) (1.11) (1.65) (1.05) (2.03) (1.09) (1.57) (0.94)
No. of months 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Gross fund returns Net fund returns





Panel B. Difference in monthly coefficients between the pre- and post-Reg FD periods 
Market-Adj Beta-Adj 3-Factor 4-Factor Market-Adj Beta-Adj 3-Factor 4-Factor
INTERCEPT Diff. 0.0053 0.0021 0.0028 0.0000 0.0054 0.0019 0.0027 -0.0002
t-stat. (1.86) (0.76) (1.43) (0.00) (1.87) (0.70) (1.39) -(0.09)
LOGFAMSIZEi, t-1 Diff. -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002
t-stat. -(2.89) -(2.58) -(1.87) -(2.18) -(2.90) -(2.62) -(1.82) -(2.13)
LOGTNAi, t-1 Diff. 0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 0.0002
t-stat. (0.88) (1.62) (0.40) (1.63) (0.86) (1.82) (0.39) (1.70)
TURNOVERi, t-1 Diff. -0.000007 -0.000003 -0.000011 -0.000007 -0.000007 -0.000003 -0.000010 -0.000007
t-stat. -(1.19) -(0.50) -(1.83) -(1.68) -(1.18) -(0.40) -(1.79) -(1.65)
AGEi, t-1 Diff. 0.000004 -0.000001 0.000020 0.000029 0.000004 -0.000004 0.000019 0.000027
t-stat. (0.28) -(0.07) (1.29) (1.98) (0.30) -(0.27) (1.20) (1.87)
EXPRATIOi, t-1 Diff. 0.0001 0.0007 -0.0004 0.0000 0.0001 0.0008 -0.0004 0.0001
t-stat. (0.11) (0.81) -(0.94) (0.03) (0.09) (0.91) -(0.84) (0.22)
TOTLOADi, t-1 Diff. -0.000046 -0.000058 0.000021 0.000022 -0.000044 -0.000061 0.000019 0.000015
t-stat. -(0.98) -(1.31) (0.88) (0.85) -(0.95) -(1.35) (0.79) (0.56)
FLOWi, t-1 Diff. 0.000000 0.000004 0.000003 0.000004 0.000000 0.000003 0.000003 0.000003
t-stat. (0.38) (2.72) (2.26) (3.11) (0.39) (2.79) (2.41) (2.98)
LAGFUNDRETi, t-1 Diff. 0.0031 -0.0094 -0.0032 -0.0047 0.0031 -0.0095 -0.0033 -0.0049
t-stat. (0.26) -(0.88) -(0.50) -(0.76) (0.25) -(0.88) -(0.52) -(0.80)
Gross fund returns Net fund returns
 
Panel C. Proportion of positive monthly coefficients in the pre- and post-Reg FD periods (%) 
Market-Adj Beta-Adj 3-Factor 4-Factor Market-Adj Beta-Adj 3-Factor 4-Factor
1992 to 1999 41.05 45.26 46.32 51.58 41.05 46.32 47.37 49.47
2001 to 2008 50.00 47.92 53.13 48.96 50.00 48.96 53.13 48.96
1992 to 1999 68.42 69.47 62.11 62.11 68.42 66.32 62.11 62.11
2001 to 2008 52.08 54.17 51.04 51.04 52.08 55.21 50.00 53.13
1992 to 1999 38.95 37.89 42.11 37.89 38.95 38.95 42.11 36.84
2001 to 2008 35.42 38.54 45.83 47.92 35.42 39.58 45.83 47.92
1992 to 1999 51.58 50.53 52.63 50.53 51.58 50.53 52.63 50.53
2001 to 2008 55.21 51.04 52.08 37.50 55.21 53.13 53.13 37.50
1992 to 1999 51.58 46.32 41.05 43.16 51.58 50.53 44.21 46.32
2001 to 2008 43.75 41.67 47.92 51.04 43.75 43.75 46.88 51.04
1992 to 1999 49.47 47.37 60.00 51.58 44.21 43.16 50.53 41.05
2001 to 2008 52.08 48.96 54.17 52.08 38.54 36.46 32.29 31.25
1992 to 1999 53.68 55.79 35.79 40.00 53.68 55.79 36.84 42.11
2001 to 2008 45.83 45.83 44.79 46.88 45.83 44.79 45.83 46.88
1992 to 1999 46.32 38.95 38.95 36.84 46.32 41.05 41.05 34.74
2001 to 2008 46.88 53.13 54.17 55.21 46.88 52.08 50.00 54.17
1992 to 1999 64.21 60.00 58.95 60.00 64.21 62.11 57.89 61.05
2001 to 2008 57.29 57.29 56.25 55.21 56.25 57.29 55.21 55.21











Notes: Gross fund returns are monthly fund returns calculated before deducting fees and expenses, and 
net fund returns are monthly fund returns calculated after deducting fees and expenses. Monthly gross 
fund returns are computed by adding back the expense ratio divided by 12 to monthly net fund returns. 
These returns are adjusted using the market return, the CAPM model, the Fama-French (1993) 3-Factor 
model, and the Carhart (1997) 4-Factor model. The dependent variables are these adjusted monthly gross 
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and net fund returns. LOGTNA is the natural logarithm of TNA. LOGFAMSIZE is the natural logarithm 
of the sum of total net assets under management of the funds in the fund family that the fund belongs to. 
TURNOVER is fund turnover ratio as provided by CRSP Mutual Fund Database, defined as the 
minimum of aggregated sales or aggregated purchases of securities, the minimum divided by the average 
12-month TNA of the fund. AGE is the number of months divided by 12 since the establishment of the 
fund. EXPRATIO is expense ratio as of the most recently completed fiscal year, as provided by CRSP 
Mutual Fund Database, defined as the ratio of total investment that shareholders pay for the fund’s 
operating expenses including 12b-1 fees and adjusted for waivers and reimbursements. TOTLOAD is 
front-end load (maximum sales charges at each investment breakpoint) averaged across each breakpoint 
plus deferred and rear-end load (maximum fees charged when withdrawing funds). FLOW is the 
percentage of new fund flows into the mutual fund over the past 12 months, defined as the fund’s TNA in 
month t minus the product of the fund’s TNA in month t-12 with the sum of one and the net fund returns 
compounded between months t -12 and t, all divided by the fund’s TNA in month t-12. FLOW is 
Winsorized at the top two percent in each pre- and post-Reg FD sample because very tiny TNA in month 
t-12 in denominator relative to the fund’s TNA in month t inflates the value of FLOW greatly. 
LAGFUNDRET is the net fund returns compounded over the past 12 months. Pre-Reg FD sample covers 
mutual funds from January 1992 to December 1999, and Post-Reg FD sample covers mutual funds from 
January 2001 to December 2008. Panel A reports the result of Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression. All 
independent variables are the values measured at the beginning of the month (lagged values) and the t-
statistics are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West (1987) lags of order three and are shown in 
parentheses. Panel B reports the results of t-tests comparing the monthly coefficients between the pre- and 
post-Reg FD periods, the monthly coefficients on each variable obtained from the Fama-MacBeth (1973) 
procedure in Panel A. Panel C reports the proportion of monthly coefficients that are positive in each pre- 





Table 3. Stock-Picking Skill of Mutual Fund Managers 
Panel A. Stock-picking skill across fund family size 
BAR1 BAR2 BAR1 BAR2 BAR1 BAR2
Mean 0.0019 0.0015 0.0029 0.0025 -0.0005 -0.0003
t-stat (3.58) (2.97) (2.90) (2.59) -(0.48) -(0.38)
Mean 0.0050 0.0048 0.0048 0.0048 0.0039 0.0036
t-stat (1.82) (1.78) (1.54) (1.73) (2.10) (1.84)
Mean 0.0012 0.0014 0.0028 0.0024 -0.0006 -0.0006
t-stat (0.48) (0.66) (1.49) (1.40) -(0.60) -(0.64)
Mean 0.0000 -0.0005 0.0013 0.0016 -0.0005 -0.0003
t-stat (0.00) -(0.40) (0.90) (1.15) -(0.38) -(0.23)
Mean 0.0024 0.0021 0.0024 0.0027 0.0006 0.0004
t-stat (2.97) (2.64) (1.63) (1.78) (0.53) (0.35)
Mean 0.0020 0.0015 0.0034 0.0025 -0.0011 -0.0009
t-stat (3.29) (2.55) (3.47) (2.70) -(1.10) -(0.95)
Pre-Reg FD Period Reduced Pre- Period Post-Reg FD Period
(1980 to 1999) (1994 to 1999) (2001 to 2006)
Family Size Quintile 4
Family Size Quintile 5
All Funds
Family Size Quintile 1
Family Size Quintile 2
Family Size Quintile 3
 
Panel B. Difference in stock-picking skill between the pre- and post-Reg FD periods 
BAR1 BAR2 BAR1 BAR2
Diff. -0.0023 -0.0018 -0.0033 -0.0028
t-stat. -(2.15) -(1.76) -(2.44) -(2.15)
Diff. -0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0009 -0.0012
t-stat. -(0.34) -(0.36) -(0.25) -(0.35)
Diff. -0.0018 -0.0020 -0.0034 -0.0030
t-stat. -(0.67) -(0.86) -(1.59) -(1.54)
Diff. -0.0005 0.0001 -0.0018 -0.0019
t-stat. -(0.30) (0.08) -(0.91) -(0.97)
Diff. -0.0018 -0.0017 -0.0018 -0.0023
t-stat. -(1.13) -(1.11) -(0.96) -(1.26)
Diff. -0.0031 -0.0024 -0.0045 -0.0034
t-stat. -(2.52) -(2.00) -(3.22) -(2.58)
All Funds
Family Size Quintile 1
 (2001 to 2006) - (1980 to 1999) (2001 to 2006) - (1994 to 1999) 
 Post-Reg FD - Pre-Reg FD Post-Reg FD  - Reduced Pre   
Family Size Quintile 2
Family Size Quintile 3
Family Size Quintile 4











Panel C. Regression of stock picking skill  
BAR1 BAR2 BAR1 BAR2 BAR1 BAR2
INTERCEPT 0.0076 0.0090 0.0061 0.0092 0.0100 0.0082
(1.44) (1.91) (1.25) (2.09) (1.46) (1.41)
LOGFAMSIZE 0.0005 0.0005 0.0006 0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0002
(1.77) (1.46) (2.13) (1.55) -(1.05) -(0.99)
LOGFUNDSIZE -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0003 -0.0002
-(2.30) -(2.48) -(2.94) -(2.86) -(0.92) -(0.76)
No. of quarters 79 79 24 24 24 24
Post-Reg FD Period
(2001 to 2006)
Pre-Reg FD Period Reduced Pre-Period
(1980 to 1999) (1994 to 1999)
 
Panel D. Difference in quarterly coefficients between the pre- and post-Reg FD periods 
BAR1 BAR2 BAR1 BAR2
INTERCEPT Diff. 0.0024 -0.0008 0.0037 -0.0012
t-stat. (0.30) -(0.10) (0.47) -(0.17)
LOGFAMSIZE Diff. -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0006
t-stat. -(2.31) -(2.08) -(2.03) -(1.77)
LOGFUNDSIZE Diff. 0.0006 0.0007 0.0006 0.0006
t-stat. (1.22) (1.59) (1.17) (1.40)
 Post-Reg FD - Pre-Reg FD Post-Reg FD  - Reduced Pre   
 (2001 to 2006) - (1980 to 1999) (2001 to 2006) - (1994 to 1999) 
 






















2001 to 2006  
Notes: BAR1 is the stock-stock picking skill measured using benchmark-adjusted earnings announcement 
returns adjusted for size and book-to-market; i.e., the difference between equal-weighted average 
benchmark-adjusted earnings announcement returns of stocks in which a mutual fund-report date 
increased its ownership during the period between the previous report date and current report date and 
those of stocks in which the same mutual fund-report date decreased its ownership during the same 
period. Earnings announcement returns are computed over the (-1,+1) day window around earnings 
announcement dates immediately followed by the current report date. BAR2 is the stock-stock picking 
skill measured using benchmark-adjusted earnings announcement returns adjusted for size, book-to-
market, and momentum. Returns are Winsorized at the top and bottom one percent. In Panel A, we first 
obtained the mean BAR1 and BAR2 among all mutual funds in each calendar quarter. We then computed 
the average of the quarterly means from 1980 to 1999 (in the pre-Reg FD period) and another average of 
the quarterly means from 2001 to 2006 (in the post-Reg FD period). The t-statistics are shown in 
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parentheses. Panel B reports the results of t-tests comparing the quarterly means of BAR1 and BAR2 
between the pre- and post-Reg FD periods, the quarterly means obtained in Panel A. Panel C reports the 
Fama-MacBeth (1973) estimates of quarterly stock picking skills of mutual funds on LOGFAMSIZE and 
LOGFUNDSIZE. LOGFAMSIZE is the natural logarithm of fund family size. Fund family size is the 
sum of market value of the portfolios held by all member funds of the fund family. LOGFUNDSIZE is 
the natural logarithm of fund size. Fund size is the market value of the portfolio held by the fund 
measured at the beginning of the year. In Panel C, all independent variables are the values measured at the 
beginning of the quarter (lagged values) and the t-statistics are adjusted for serial correlation using 
Newey-West (1987) lags of order three and are shown in parentheses. Panel D reports the results of t-tests 
comparing the quarterly coefficients between the pre- and post-Reg FD periods, the quarterly coefficients 
on each variable obtained from the Fama-MacBeth (1973) procedure in Panel C. Panel E reports the 
proportion of quarterly coefficients that are positive in each pre- and post-Reg FD period, the quarterly 
coefficients obtained from the Fama-MacBeth (1973) procedure in Panel C. 
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Table 4. Regression of Fund Performance in 1999 and 2001 
Panel A. Results of regression analysis 
Pre-Reg FD Period (1999) 
Market-Adj Beta-Adj 3-Factor 4-Factor Market-Adj Beta-Adj 3-Factor 4-Factor
INTERCEPT -0.0223 -0.0227 -0.0124 -0.0097 -0.0223 -0.0222 -0.0117 -0.0090
-(1.97) -(2.10) -(2.39) -(2.25) -(1.97) -(2.04) -(2.33) -(2.11)
LOGFAMSIZEi, t-1 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004
(2.20) (4.62) (2.39) (2.89) (2.20) (4.09) (2.50) (2.98)
LOGTNAi, t-1 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0006
-(1.70) -(1.11) -(1.02) -(1.43) -(1.69) -(1.22) -(1.10) -(1.47)
TURNOVERi, t-1 0.000040 0.000041 0.000030 0.000026 0.000040 0.000042 0.000030 0.000027
(3.87) (3.24) (3.11) (1.81) (3.87) (3.26) (3.06) (1.89)
AGEi, t-1 0.000023 0.000028 0.000020 0.000021 0.000023 0.000033 0.000020 0.000019
(0.70) (0.79) (0.79) (0.72) (0.70) (0.89) (0.74) (0.65)
EXPRATIOi, t-1 0.0033 0.0037 0.0021 0.0021 0.0025 0.0025 0.0008 0.0008
(2.77) (2.58) (3.07) (2.61) (2.07) (1.63) (1.35) (1.01)
TOTLOADi, t-1 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
-(0.92) -(1.78) -(5.75) -(5.48) -(0.92) -(1.51) -(4.38) -(5.36)
FLOWi, t-1 -0.000006 -0.000011 -0.000008 -0.000010 -0.000006 -0.000008 -0.000007 -0.000008
-(2.06) -(2.30) -(2.91) -(4.56) -(2.06) -(3.18) -(2.77) -(3.32)
LAGFUNDRETi, t-1 0.0614 0.0585 0.0289 0.0252 0.0614 0.0582 0.0288 0.0249
(1.75) (1.73) (2.80) (6.30) (1.75) (1.73) (2.81) (5.95)
No. of months 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Post-Reg FD Period (2001)
Market-Adj Beta-Adj 3-Factor 4-Factor Market-Adj Beta-Adj 3-Factor 4-Factor
INTERCEPT 0.0063 0.0063 0.0048 0.0015 0.0063 0.0059 0.0048 0.0011
(1.63) (1.63) (2.14) (0.52) (1.62) (1.62) (1.98) (0.34)
LOGFAMSIZEi, t-1 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002
-(0.70) -(0.68) -(1.46) -(1.51) -(0.64) -(0.70) -(1.25) -(1.41)
LOGTNAi, t-1 -0.0009 -0.0006 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0009 -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0001
-(3.23) -(2.36) -(1.09) -(0.08) -(3.22) -(2.43) -(1.35) -(0.14)
TURNOVERi, t-1 -0.000011 -0.000007 -0.000027 -0.000021 -0.000011 -0.000006 -0.000027 -0.000020
-(1.06) -(0.66) -(1.70) -(3.96) -(1.06) -(0.51) -(1.61) -(4.02)
AGEi, t-1 0.000038 -0.000014 0.000003 -0.000013 0.000038 -0.000012 0.000000 -0.000019
(1.80) -(0.37) (0.08) -(0.35) (1.80) -(0.32) (0.01) -(0.49)
EXPRATIOi, t-1 0.0002 0.0012 0.0000 0.0006 -0.0006 0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0002
(0.15) (1.46) (0.03) (0.87) -(0.44) (0.61) -(2.22) -(0.26)
TOTLOADi, t-1 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001
-(0.82) -(2.85) -(1.75) -(1.46) -(0.81) -(3.49) -(3.07) -(1.74)
FLOWi, t-1 -0.000003 0.000002 0.000000 0.000002 -0.000003 0.000000 0.000000 0.000001
-(1.16) (1.31) (0.14) (0.73) -(1.17) (0.07) (0.05) (0.49)
LAGFUNDRETi, t-1 0.0439 0.0311 0.0211 0.0139 0.0438 0.0313 0.0205 0.0134
(1.92) (1.60) (2.77) (1.30) (1.92) (1.62) (2.68) (1.24)
No. of months 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Gross fund returns Net fund returns





Panel B. Difference in monthly coefficients between 1999 and 2001 
Market-Adj Beta-Adj 3-Factor 4-Factor Market-Adj Beta-Adj 3-Factor 4-Factor
INTERCEPT Diff. 0.0286 0.0290 0.0172 0.0112 0.0286 0.0280 0.0165 0.0101
t-stat. (2.72) (3.23) (2.82) (2.02) (2.71) (3.07) (2.65) (1.82)
LOGFAMSIZEi, t-1 Diff. -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0006
t-stat. -(1.59) -(1.46) -(1.82) -(2.17) -(1.58) -(1.59) -(1.81) -(2.12)
LOGTNAi, t-1 Diff. -0.0005 -0.0004 0.0000 0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0003 0.0000 0.0005
t-stat. -(1.27) -(1.15) (0.07) (1.00) -(1.29) -(0.93) (0.05) (1.04)
TURNOVERi, t-1 Diff. -0.000051 -0.000049 -0.000057 -0.000047 -0.000051 -0.000048 -0.000057 -0.000047
t-stat. -(2.40) -(1.92) -(2.17) -(2.97) -(2.41) -(1.84) -(2.09) -(2.94)
AGEi, t-1 Diff. 0.000014 -0.000043 -0.000017 -0.000034 0.000015 -0.000046 -0.000020 -0.000038
t-stat. (0.40) -(0.71) -(0.25) -(0.72) (0.41) -(0.78) -(0.28) -(0.79)
EXPRATIOi, t-1 Diff. -0.0031 -0.0026 -0.0021 -0.0015 -0.0031 -0.0021 -0.0017 -0.0010
t-stat. -(1.15) -(1.07) -(1.99) -(0.95) -(1.16) -(0.90) -(1.64) -(0.68)
TOTLOADi, t-1 Diff. 0.000003 0.000004 0.000057 0.000070 0.000004 0.000003 0.000050 0.000045
t-stat. (0.02) (0.02) (1.27) (0.96) (0.03) (0.02) (1.06) (0.61)
FLOWi, t-1 Diff. 0.000003 0.000013 0.000008 0.000012 0.000003 0.000008 0.000007 0.000008
t-stat. (0.74) (2.13) (1.33) (2.08) (0.74) (1.97) (1.56) (2.16)
LAGFUNDRETi, t-1 Diff. -0.0175 -0.0274 -0.0077 -0.0112 -0.0175 -0.0269 -0.0082 -0.0114
t-stat. -(0.41) -(0.81) -(0.45) -(0.60) -(0.41) -(0.80) -(0.49) -(0.62)
Gross fund returns Net fund returns
 
Panel C. Proportion of positive monthly coefficients in 1999 and 2001 (%) 
Market-Adj Beta-Adj 3-Factor 4-Factor Market-Adj Beta-Adj 3-Factor 4-Factor
1999 33.33 16.67 33.33 33.33 33.33 16.67 33.33 25.00
2001 75.00 83.33 66.67 50.00 75.00 83.33 66.67 58.33
1999 75.00 83.33 75.00 75.00 75.00 66.67 75.00 75.00
2001 41.67 41.67 33.33 41.67 41.67 50.00 33.33 41.67
1999 25.00 33.33 33.33 8.33 25.00 33.33 33.33 16.67
2001 8.33 16.67 41.67 50.00 8.33 16.67 41.67 41.67
1999 75.00 83.33 66.67 83.33 75.00 83.33 66.67 83.33
2001 50.00 50.00 41.67 8.33 50.00 50.00 41.67 8.33
1999 66.67 66.67 50.00 50.00 66.67 75.00 50.00 58.33
2001 58.33 41.67 50.00 41.67 58.33 41.67 50.00 41.67
1999 75.00 75.00 83.33 91.67 75.00 75.00 66.67 58.33
2001 58.33 66.67 58.33 58.33 58.33 58.33 33.33 41.67
1999 41.67 41.67 16.67 16.67 41.67 41.67 25.00 16.67
2001 41.67 41.67 25.00 25.00 41.67 33.33 33.33 33.33
1999 16.67 16.67 41.67 25.00 16.67 16.67 33.33 16.67
2001 33.33 58.33 50.00 41.67 33.33 33.33 41.67 41.67
1999 75.00 83.33 75.00 75.00 75.00 83.33 75.00 83.33













Notes: Gross fund returns are monthly fund returns calculated before deducting fees and expenses, and 
net fund returns are monthly fund returns calculated after deducting fees and expenses. Monthly gross 
fund returns are computed by adding back the expense ratio divided by 12 to monthly net fund returns. 
These returns are adjusted using the market return, the CAPM model, the Fama-French (1993) 3-Factor 
model, and the Carhart (1997) 4-Factor model. The dependent variables are these adjusted monthly gross 
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and net fund returns. LOGTNA is the natural logarithm of TNA. LOGFAMSIZE is the natural logarithm 
of the sum of total net assets under management of the funds in the fund family that the fund belongs to. 
TURNOVER is fund turnover ratio as provided by CRSP Mutual Fund Database, defined as the 
minimum of aggregated sales or aggregated purchases of securities, the minimum divided by the average 
12-month TNA of the fund. AGE is the number of months divided by 12 since the establishment of the 
fund. EXPRATIO is expense ratio as of the most recently completed fiscal year, as provided by CRSP 
Mutual Fund Database, defined as the ratio of total investment that shareholders pay for the fund’s 
operating expenses including 12b-1 fees and adjusted for waivers and reimbursements. TOTLOAD is 
front-end load (maximum sales charges at each investment breakpoint) averaged across each breakpoint 
plus deferred and rear-end load (maximum fees charged when withdrawing funds). FLOW is the 
percentage of new fund flows into the mutual fund over the past 12 months, defined as the fund’s TNA in 
month t minus the product of the fund’s TNA in month t-12 with the sum of one and the net fund returns 
compounded between months t -12 and t, all divided by the fund’s TNA in month t-12. FLOW is 
Winsorized at the top two percent in each pre- and post-Reg FD sample because very tiny TNA in month 
t-12 in denominator relative to the fund’s TNA in month t inflates the value of FLOW greatly. 
LAGFUNDRET is the net fund returns compounded over the past 12 months. Pre-Reg FD sample covers 
mutual funds from January 1999 to December 1999, and Post-Reg FD sample covers mutual funds from 
January 2001 to December 2001. Panel A reports the result of Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression. All 
independent variables are the values measured at the beginning of the month (lagged values) and the t-
statistics are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West (1987) lags of order three and are shown in 
parentheses. Panel B reports the results of t-tests comparing the monthly coefficients between the pre- and 
post-Reg FD periods, the monthly coefficients on each variable obtained from the Fama-MacBeth (1973) 
procedure in Panel A. Panel C reports the proportion of monthly coefficients that are positive in each pre- 




Table 5. Regression of Analyst Forecast Revision Score (REVSCORE) 
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Difference Difference Difference
(1998 to 1999) (2001 to 2002) (2004 to 2005) in Coefficients in Coefficients in Coefficients
REVSCORE REVSCORE REVSCORE (Period 3 - 1) (Period 2 - 1) (Period 3 - 2)
INTERCEPT 0.0490 -0.0156 0.2154 0.1665 -0.0646 0.2310
(0.39) -(0.65) (4.59) (1.56) -(0.60) (3.44)
LOGFAMSIZE 0.0077 0.0013 0.0004 -0.0074 -0.0064 -0.0009
(4.04) (0.65) (0.15) -(1.75) -(1.53) -(0.21)
LOGFUNDSIZE -0.0106 -0.0013 -0.0118 -0.0012 0.0093 -0.0105
-(1.88) -(1.03) -(9.59) -(0.21) (1.66) -(2.54)
No. of quarters 8 8 8  
Notes: REVSCORE measures the extent to which a mutual fund’s trades are consistent with information 
implied by analyst forecast revisions. A mutual funds’ REVSCORE is computed as the difference 
between the equal-weighted average analyst forecast revision of stocks in which the mutual fund 
increased its ownership during the period between the previous report date and current report date and 
those of stocks in which the same mutual fund-report date decreased its ownership during the same 
period. A stocks’ analyst forecast revision is defined as 1 (-1) if the median quarterly earnings forecast 
issued during the last month in quarter t is higher (lower) than the median quarterly earnings forecast 
issued during the last month in quarter t-1. If there is no change in median quarterly earnings forecast 
between quarters, the analyst forecast revision takes a value of zero. REVSCORE is Winsorized at the top 
and bottom one percent. Table 5 reports the Fama-MacBeth (1973) estimates of quarterly REVSCORE of 
mutual funds on LOGFAMSIZE and LOGFUNDSIZE, with REVSCORE computed using quarterly 
earnings forecasts of analysts from large investment banks subject to the GS.LOGFAMSIZE is the natural 
logarithm of fund family size. Fund family size is the sum of market value of the portfolios held by all 
member funds of the fund family. LOGFUNDSIZE is the natural logarithm of fund size. Fund size is the 
market value of the portfolio held by the fund measured at the beginning of the year. All independent 
variables are the values measured at the beginning of the quarter (lagged values) and the t-statistics are 
adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West (1987) lags of order three and are shown in parentheses. 
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Figure 1. Moving Average of the Forward 8 Year Regression Coefficients on LOGFAMSIZE 
 
Notes: Figure 1 plots the moving average of the forward 8 year regression coefficients on LOGFAMSIZE 
for the market adjusted returns.  The figure plots data over the period from 1964 to 2008 (excluding 2000 
with is the transition year).  To ensure that we do not use coefficient from the post-Reg FD period to 
calculate the 8 year moving average, for periods between 1993 and 1999 the number of years used to 
calculate the average coefficients gets progressively smaller with the 1999 coefficient being just one 
year’s number.  We apply a similar process to the post-Reg FD period, with the 2001 number representing 
an average of coefficients from 2001 to 2008 and the 2008 coefficient being that year’s number.   
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